Useful Links
Boston University, Pardee Center
Information
- Date submitted: 13 Sep 2011
- Stakeholder type: Major Group
- Name: Boston University, Pardee Center
- Submission Document: Download
Full Submission
Rio+20: Accountability and
Implementation as Key Goals
Adil Najam and Miquel Muñoz
About the authors
Prof. Adil Najam was recently appointed
Vice Chancellor of the Lahore
University of Management
Sciences (LUMS) in Pakistan
and was until recently the
Director of the Frederick
S. Pardee Center for the
Study of the Longer-Range
Future. He works on issues
of international diplomacy,
sustainable development, and
human well-being, with a focus
on developing countries.
Dr. Miquel Muñoz, a Post-
Doctoral Fellow at the
Frederick S. Pardee Center
for the Study of the Longer-
Range Future, specializes
in renewable energy,
sustainable development
and climate change. He has
participated in numerous
international environmental
negotiations.
Sustainable Development Insights is a
series of short policy essays supporting
the Sustainable Development
Knowledge Partnership (SDKP) and
edited by Boston University?s Frederick
S. Pardee Center for the Study of the
Longer-Range Future. The series seeks
to promote a broad interdisciplinary
dialogue on how to accelerate
sustainable development at all levels.
For more than two decades the Global
Environmental Governance (GEG)
system has been a story of growth, and
there is much progress to celebrate:
scores of new international institutions;
a proliferation of legal instruments,
declarations, and financial mechanisms;
growing public interest; multiple layers
of national structures; an impressive
knowledge economy serviced by
multitudes of experts in governments,
academia and in civil society. Most
importantly, perhaps, the idea of
sustainable development is now firmly
ensconced as the very central goal of all
environmental governance. Arguably,
environmental governance can now only
be understood within the context of the
sustainable development imperative.
Despite the fact that there is much to
be justifiably proud of in this growth
in the infrastructure of governance, the
global challenges have in fact multiplied
in both number and intensity. This is
partly because our understanding of
the extent and nature of many of the
challenges has itself grown, and many
of the problems have proven to be far
more complex and difficult to deal
with than we had once assumed. But it
is also evident that while much of the global effort has focused on negotiating
agreements, there has been little
focus on implementing the
agreements or holding
international actors
accountable for their global
commitments. One does
not wish to be harsh in this
assessment, since we are still
in the relatively early days of
this global enterprise. However,
as we prepare for the forthcoming 2012
United Nations Conference on
Sustainable Development
(known as ?Rio+20?),
an accountability and
implementation deficit now
stares us squarely in the
face. And Rio+20 would be
a very good moment to start
seriously addressing this deficit.
Stakeholders at all levels are
aware of the urgency for the GEG
system to deliver on its promise of
implementation. However, there are
obstacles to achieving this goal, none
more important than a widely prevalent
?culture of unaccountability.? For years,
talk of accountability was feared by
many who considered it a threat and
resisted by others who saw it as a distraction from ?real issues.? We
believe that this is no longer the
case. There is a growing realization
of the costs of unaccountability,
an evolution of norms in related
governance areas, and a recognition
that accountability is a key lever
for implementation. Importantly,
Rio+20 and its focus on the
institutional challenges to sustainable
development provide an opportunity
to bring the issues of accountability
and implementation to the forefront.
This paper seeks to develop a
practical agenda for institutional
reform to improve implementation
by identifying a set of incremental
and plausible steps in two areas: (a)
strengthening the mechanics that
cultivate accountability, and (b)
putting into place the institutional
arrangements that nurture these
mechanics. A first and important
step, however, is to recognize
the aforementioned ?culture of
unaccountability.?
The Culture of
Unaccountability
A ?culture of unaccountability? is
perhaps the most significant enabler
of unaccountability and, thus, lack
of implementation in GEG. It is
important to understand why the
culture of unaccountability has
become such a pervasive feature of
the GEG system. Our previous work
(Najam and Halle 2010) identified
several reasons.
Global environmental governance
is declaratory in nature, relying on
values-based and knowledge-based
persuasion, in contrast to other
?rules-based? areas of international
governance. The dominant culture
is one of moral persuasion ? GEG
efforts are generally based on the premise that if all countries do the
?right thing,? this is good not only
for them, but for everyone else. This
approach, however, leads to the
classic free-rider problem. Rulesbased
GEG exists ? e.g. ozone and
CITES ? but, as best exemplified
by the Kyoto Protocol, rules-based
GEG has severe accountability and
compliance deficits.
The GEG system has evolved within
a negotiation paradigm, rather than
an implementation mindset. The
accelerated growth in the number
and intensity of GEG negotiations
during the last two decades has
resulted in an over-heated, neverending
negotiation system that
can sometimes see negotiation
as its primary function and goal.
Environmental institutions have
morphed into ? and see themselves
as ? negotiation support services. As
a result, GEG efforts are measured
by negotiation metrics rather than by
actual environmental improvements.
Often, implementation stakeholders
have little ownership of the treaties
that they inherit from the negotiators.
Developing countries? few resources
are siphoned off to servicing
the appetites of international
negotiation, at the expense of
domestic implementation.
Global realities are being shaped by
forces beyond the nation-state, yet
key actors remain unrepresented
in the GEG system. Despite wellmeaning
yet token participation,
most non-state actors ? whether civil
society groups, business interests,
or local communities ? have no
real tools to hold the international
system accountable for its actions (or
inaction); nor does the international
system have any real tools with which
to engage with civil society.
Beyond shaming, there is no
disincentive for failing to implement.
Shaming itself becomes less effective
as repeated failure leads to an
increased culture of unaccountability,
where the norm seems to be that
implementation of commitments is
optional, rather than mandatory. In
addition, there is a short institutional
memory of who committed or
failed to implement what, which
leads to further impunity for failing
to implement, even for the soft
standards of naming and shaming.
Towards More
Accountability: A
Pragmatic Agenda
It is impossible to undo the culture
of unaccountability with the stroke
of a pen. As any large organization
knows, institutional cultures cannot
be changed overnight, and changes
require long-term dedicated toplevel
commitment. What is needed
is a set of ?radically incremental?
steps to begin creating an alternative
culture of accountability that
refines, reinforces and rewards the
habits of accountability within
the international system, while
discouraging unaccountability.
This can be done by identifying
those elements within the GEG
system that are doable today and
will begin developing a culture of
accountability, steering the system
in the right direction. These steps
include enabling accountability
mechanics and enabling institutional
arrangements, both of which are
discussed in greater detail below.
Enabling Accountability
Mechanics
We define accountability mechanics
as those measures that cultivate
and facilitate accountability. These
include metrics and reporting, transparency, compliance, and
capacity building.
1. Improved Metrics and
Reporting Mechanics
Effective mandated reporting
requirements must be defined to
gauge progress against obligations
and commitments, using agreed
upon sets of performance Indicators.
Improved metrics are required,
especially metrics that measure
actual progress in environmental
matters, rather than effort. In
physics, moving a single brick
represents more work than pushing
a wall for days. In a fitting analogy,
for the GEG system we want to know
how many environmental bricks have
been moved, not how many years
governments spent pushing against
walls. Particularly relevant are
metrics reflecting bottom-up and
local approaches. After all, action
and implementation are ultimately
local affairs.
It is important to emphasize that
good Indicators and reporting
cost money, both for monitoring
and data collection, and for the
actual preparation and submission
of reports. For instance, the cost
of preparing a single national
report on implementation for
the UN Convention to Combat
Desertification has been estimated
at approximately US$56,000. Even
such modest estimations, if spread
across the spectrum of multi-lateral
environmental agreements (MEAs)
and the GEG system, quickly escalate
to significant amounts. Thus, improved metrics and reporting
requirements cannot be slapped into
an agreement as an afterthought,
but need to be conceived and
endowed with appropriate resources.
Importantly, there are synergies and
economies to be had if reporting
metrics for different MEAs are
coordinated and cross-learning
is encouraged.
In addition to being appropriately
funded, reporting needs to be more
effective in conveying meaningful
information. Volume after volume
after volume of reports may keep their authors busy, but mostly go
unread and join their predecessors
in the ever-growing pile feeding the
global data overload. We need better
reporting, not more reports. Effective
reporting places asymmetrical
requirements on different countries.
Developing countries will require
assistance for capacity-building
and other enabling measures, while
developed countries need to take
the lead with clear and accurate
reporting, including on fulfillment
of existing commitments. Reporting,
particularly self-reporting, also has
asymmetrical consequences, where
weaker parties can be penalized (for
example by donors) for reporting
failure, while more powerful
countries face no repercussions.
This needs to be recognized and
addressed if effective reporting is
to be achieved.
Accountability in the GEG System
There are at least three different types of accountability in the GEG system that need to be addressed separately:
Accountability to mandate. Is an international organization accomplishing what it was created to accomplish? Businesses are
most clear on this type of accountability, which is measured by their bottom lines. International organizations are surprisingly
silent on this. For example, a treaty secretariat or national representative is more likely to tell you how many meetings were
held and how many decisions were made than to say whether, how, and to what extent the purpose of the treaty was advanced
because of these meetings and decisions.
Institutional accountability. Is an organization well- managed? Managerial processes, such as hiring, staff performance and
reward, budgetary controls, etc., have occasionally become the subject of public discussion, but usually only when they become
?scandals,? raised by those who wish to discredit the GEG system. Supporters of the GEG system often choose to wink, nod, and
ignore blatant managerial abuse in international organizations, thus being complicit in a conspiracy of silence, just because they
do not wish to strengthen the hands of those out to ?cut the system down to size.?
Accountability to constituency. Whom are international organizations accountable to? This gets straight to the power politics of
institutions, including inter-state, intra-state and non-state actor politics. It can be argued that global citizenry is the constituency of
global environmental institutions, with Member States acting as custodians. While global citizenry interacts with global institutions
through the state apparatus, in doing so it does not cede its right to hold these institutions and their actions accountable.
2. Improved Transparency
Mechanics
Transparency is a key element of
accountability, especially with regard
to review and monitoring programs.
There are different review models,
each with their advantages and
drawbacks. The essential element
is that the monitoring of GEG
performance becomes independently
verifiable and allows the involvement
of third parties. Existing review
mechanisms include those based
on self-reviews, third-party reviews,
and peer-reviews. An example of
third-party review is the OECD?s
Environmental Performance Review
(EPR) Programme, while a review
based on voluntary national
presentations is exemplified by the
MDG Annual Ministerial Review.
Peer-reviews are a growing area of
interest, with examples found in
OECD DAC peer reviews, NEPAD?s
African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), or nationally-initiated peerreviews,
such as France?s peer-review
of National Sustainable Development
Strategies. Other review approaches
are being explored, including UNEP?s
work on MEA review methodology,
or bottom-up approaches based on
local review mechanisms. Review
mechanisms have to be conceived
and understood as collaborative
efforts in the context of eradication
of the culture of unaccountability,
rather than as an impingement
on sovereignty or stepping into
some other agency?s mandate.
Environmental leaders need to set
this culture in motion by voluntarily
initiating such performance reviews to
establish themselves as the purveyors
of best practice. Once enough of
them take the lead in this, it will
become more and more difficult for
other actors not to follow suit.
Monitoring is a task where NGOs
and whistle blowers have traditionally
been active, either in a collaborative
way, such as the civil society-led
wildlife trade monitoring network,
TRAFFIC, or through a more
aggressive approach, such as the
Environmental Intelligence Agency.
The internet and information
technologies open a new range of
possibilities for monitoring and
transparency. From a top-down or
centralized perspective, the possibility
of transmitting and revealing large
quantities of information at the click
of a mouse allows for centralized
transparency or ?raw? accountability.
Wikileaks has already had an impact
on climate change and other MEA
negotiations. While the jury is out on whether such data dumps are
good or bad for the overall health
of the system, the number of similar
episodes is likely to grow. Given the
predictable recurrence, it would
be wise to conceptualize ways in
which the impact of such ?leaks?
can be positively channeled towards
accountability and implementation.
3. Improved Compliance
Mechanics
An effective set of compliance
incentives entails a delicate balance
of ?sticks? and ?carrots.? The problem
of accountability is not only that the
system does not punish bad behavior,
but also that it does not reward good
behavior. A system of incentives for
better performance with rewards for
good behavior and early action is
needed to complement monitoring
and penalty-based approaches.
Rewards for countries who live up
to their commitments, for example,
could include trade preferences, or
preferential access to international
credit or to global support funds
such as the Global Environmental
Facility (GEF). There is ample
precedent of needs-based preferential
treatment, so perhaps it is also time
for performance-based preferential
treatment. It must be stressed that
a country?s performance should not
only be compared to that of similar
countries, but, most importantly,
against itself. Is a country doing
better over time?
The transparency mechanisms
discussed above should be linked
directly to compliance. The key
element is for the information to
clearly show whether agreements are being complied with or not. Such
information, when available across
countries, will itself become a source
of real pressure on countries to
improve their image ? i.e., be seen to
be compliant to, rather than deviant
from, their global responsibilities.
4. Capacity Building
The need for more and better
capacity building in developing
countries is a permanent demand in
the GEG system. The lack of capacity
in developing countries is a real and
urgent problem that, among its many
consequences, perpetuates the lack
of accountability (for both developed
and developing countries) and makes
implementation more difficult, and
sometimes impossible. The role
of capacity building in improving
accountability and implementation
cannot be underestimated. However,
the key question ? as in so many
capacity building issues ? is capacity
for whom and capacity for what?
To begin with, capacity enhancement
for improved reporting, transparency,
and compliance is needed. Moreover,
it is needed at the national (and
sometimes local) levels. In essence,
we are talking about the capacity to
implement and the capacity to be
able to account for implementation.
The creation of structural and
permanent capacity in developing
countries to monitor, report, and
analyze information related to
implementation is an urgent need.
Importantly, such capacity is needed
in governmental as well as nongovernmental
institutions so that
effective networks for accountability
can be created and sustained.
Enabling Institutional
Arrangements
Institutional arrangements are
needed to nurture accountability
mechanics and foster a culture of accountability, including
by strengthening the habits of
accountability and reinforcing
these habits in a positive fashion.
Institutions are important, but they will only succeed to the extent that
they manage to change the culture
of unaccountability, thus ensuring
accountability and implementation in
the longer-term.
H i g h - L e v e l B r a i n s t o r m i n g S e s s i o n :
?Accountability and Implementation:
The Keys to Sustainable Development?
The Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range
Future at Boston University co-hosted a side event on ?Accountability
and Implementation: The Keys to Sustainable Development? at the
Second Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference on
Sustainable Development (Rio+20) on March 8, 2011.
The event, supported by the Nordic UN Missions of Denmark, Finland,
Iceland, Norway, and Sweden to the United Nations in New York,
was attended by senior diplomats, nongovernmental experts, and
scholars, and served as a high-level brainstorming session to identify
key steps towards accountability and implementation in the global
environmental governance system. The session was chaired by Amb.
Carsten Staur (Denmark), facilitated by Prof. Adil Najam (BU Pardee
Center), and included presentations by Sen. Elizabeth Thompson
(Barbados), Dr. André Aranha Corrêa do Lago (Brazil), Dr. Asad Khan
(Pakistan), Amb. Irene Freudenschuss-Reichl (Austria), and
Dr. Bradnee Chambers (UNEP).
The brainstorming session with senior practitioners provided valuable
input into the ideas presented in this paper. The session highlighted
the fact that accountability is now clearly seen as a key challenge for all
global governance, including for governance in pursuit of sustainable
development, and especially in the context of Rio+20 discussions.
While there is wide support in both North and South for addressing
accountability concerns, the preferred approaches of various actors
range from largely voluntary initiatives to more mandatory measures.
The urgency for a meaningful response, however, seems shared by all.
1. Compendium of Best Practices
One component of encouraging
a cultural shift away from
unaccountability is to establish a
compendium of best practices in
accountability. Despite the prevailing
culture of unaccountability in GEG,
throughout the system there are
cases and examples of good practice.
These cases need to be documented
and understood, both to avoid
reinventing the wheel and to increase
the levels of expectation. Recognizing
and rewarding (even if just by
acknowledging) good practice will
likely foster replication and nudge
the system towards a culture of
accountability.
The compendium should not be
conceived as one more publication.
After all, as mentioned above, what
is needed is better information, not
more reports. The compendium
of best practices, then, should be
conceived as a dynamic learning
process, where best practices
are not only compiled, but also
dissected and analyzed, providing
the added value of highlighting
what worked where, when, and
why. Within this framework, a
publication providing a yearly
snapshot could be presented at the
annual meeting of the Commission
on Sustainable Development (CSD)
with the main goal of celebrating
and acknowledging good practice,
thus reinforcing a system of positive
rewards. Different from other
reports, such a compendium could
?live? on the internet ? in a manner
that allows it to be dynamically accessed as well as updated.
Any such compendium would
be greatly strengthened if it also
included information on ?bad
practice,? if only as exemplars of
what is to be avoided. Knowing
best practice helps us to avoid
reinventing the wheel; knowing bad
practice prevents us from stumbling
twice against the same stone. The
idea should not be to shame, but to
outline a clear sense of what is not
desirable and why.
2. Registry of Commitments
With very few exceptions, every
conference of the parties (CoP),
subsidiary body, and any other
GEG meeting results in decisions,
conclusions, declarations, plans of
action/implementation and a myriad
of other agreements that ultimately
boil down to commitments. How
many commitments, by whom, and
on what? Which ones have been
fulfilled? No one really knows, as
many commitments are already
forgotten by the time the next
meeting is held and most remain
unimplemented.
There is an urgent need for a
centralized registry of commitments
that keeps track of which country
or institution has agreed to do
what, and the extent to which that
commitment has been fulfilled.
Having an open, transparent,
and easily accessible record of all
commitments will have a healthy
effect on the system and keep
negotiators from re-inventing the wheel over and over again. With
the register of commitments,
negotiators will have a handy
reference to existing agreements
and an incentive to make only those
commitments that countries have
the intention or capacity to fulfill.
Most importantly, such a register will
move the focus away from the need
to be seen to reaching agreement
on ?new? commitments (even when
they are not new at all) and towards
a discussion of how well we are
doing ? or not ? in fulfilling ?old?
commitments.
The proposed registry could quickly
evolve from a mere compilation
of commitments to a system of
commitment tracking and reporting.
Similar mechanisms are being
developed in an ad hoc basis for
specific issue-areas, such as climate
finance, but no GEG-wide registry
system is in place. Examples include
OECD?s tracking of development
financing, or the proposal for GEG
finance tracking (Najam and Muñoz
2008). Institutionally, UNEP would
perhaps be best placed to host this
register since it has the institutionwide
mandate for information
gathering and knowledge creation.
Indeed, placing such a system within
UNEP would also serve to strengthen
UNEP in other significant ways. For
example, it would provide a renewed
reason for better inter-institution
coordination, especially between
MEA secretariats and UN agencies
and programmes.
3. (Re)New(ed) Focus for CSD
Recent events at the Commission on
Sustainable Development (CSD) have
again highlighted the fact that it is an
institution with a forever uncertain
future. Constrained by the straight
jacket of a rather inflexible 14 year
Programme of Work, its negotiation role severely weakened by an inability
to deliver, the CSD clearly needs to
rediscover itself again. Born from
the Rio Earth Summit 20 years ago,
CSD has the perfect opportunity at
Rio+20 to reach back to its roots
and renew itself as the agency it was
originally designed to be.
Revisiting the original mandate of
CSD provides useful inspiration, particularly
in terms of how important
the accountability and implementation
role was in the original design
of this platform. For example, the
original architects of the CSD had
envisaged its role as including:
?monitor progress in [?] activities related
to the integration of environmental and
developmental goals throughout the United
Nations system through analysis and evaluation
of reports from all relevant organs,
organizations, programmes and institutions
of the United Nations system dealing with
various issues of environment and development;?
and ?consider [?] information
regarding the progress made in the implementation
of environmental conventions.?
Thus, we propose that the CSD
returns to its original purpose, and
becomes a reporting and assessment
hub, the place where the world meets
once a year to assess and to report
on progress towards sustainable
development, including on
environmental issues. It would thus
cease to act as a negotiating forum
and embrace its original design more
wholeheartedly than it has in its first two decades. Accountability of GEG
(as well as the other dimensions of
Global Governance for Sustainable
Development) would become the key
function of the CSD.
We envision a reporting process
where secretariats would be tasked
(and given the necessary tools
and mandate) to assess progress
towards the respective goals of their
organizations, and to develop their
reports based but not dependent on
national reporting. The focus would
be measuring actual progress, rather
than effort, as illustrated earlier
with the ?pushing the wall? analogy.
Importantly, the idea is not that
agencies report ?to? the CSD, but that
they report ?at? the CSD. This is a key
distinction. The idea here is for the
CSD to return to its conception as
a forum that brings together the key
actors in GEG to take stock of where
we are in our global commitment to
sustainable development, what have
we achieved, and what still remains
to be done. The idea is not to give
the CSD a punitive or regulatory role,
but rather to turn it into a venue
for an ongoing assessment of the
global progress towards sustainable
development.
4. T owards a Global Instrument
(?A Global Aarhus?)
Ultimately we are ready to move
towards the next step of creating
a global legal instrument to enhance greater accountability in
environmental governance.
The Economic Commission for
Europe?s Aarhus Convention on
Access to Information, Public
Participation in Decision-making and
Access to Justice in Environmental
Matters is a working model that
has been widely cited as a success.
The Aarhus convention, however, is
regionally limited in scope. It may
be time for a global instrument,
a global version of the Aarhus
Convention, to improve the GEG
system and move it towards a new
culture of accountability. As we begin
preparations for the 2012 Rio+20
conference, negotiation of such a
global instrument might be a goal
that Rio+20 sets for itself. If the great
achievement of the Rio conference
in 1992 was that it triggered a
surge of global environmental
negotiations and environmental
instruments, it would be a fitting
goal for Rio+20 to put together
a robust system of accountability
around these negotiations and
instruments. Such an instrument
clearly would be Aarhus-plus. Not
only because it would be global,
but more importantly because it
could incorporate the type of steps
and recommendations outlined in
this paper: an umbrella agreement
which brings together a system
of better accountability for better
implementation in GEG.
Sustainable Development
Knowledge Partnership (SDKP)
brings together governments,
individuals, institutions, and
networks engaged in the production
and dissemination of knowledge on
sustainable development, including
research institutions and sustainable
development expert networks. Its
aim is to organize knowledge on
sustainable development and make
it available to policy makers and
practitioners. The Partnership
is supported by the Division for
Sustainable Development of
the United Nations. Sustainable
Development Insights is a contribution
of The Frederick S. Pardee Center for
the Study of the Longer-Range Future
at Boston University to the SDKP.
The Frederick S. Pardee Center for
the Study of the Longer-Range
Future at Boston University
convenes and conducts
interdisciplinary, policy-relevant, and
future-oriented research that can
contribute to long-term improvements
in the human condition. Through its
programs of research, publications
and events, the Center seeks to
identify, anticipate, and enhance
the long-term potential for human
progress, in all its various dimensions.
Sustainable Development Insights
Series Editor: Prof. Adil Najam
Boston University
Pardee House
67 Bay State Road
Boston, MA 02215 USA
pardee@bu.edu
+1 617-358-4000 (tel.)
+1 617-358-4001 (fax)
www.bu.edu/pardee
The views expressed in Sustainable
Development Insights are strictly those
of the author(s) and should not be assumed
to represent the position of their own
institutions, of Boston University, of the
Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study
of the Longer-Range Future, or the United
Nations.